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Dr. Squatch: Jack Haldrup. From a Closet Full of Soap to a $1.5 Billion Brand
How I Built This with Guy RazGrowth

Dr. Squatch: Jack Haldrup. From a Closet Full of Soap to a $1.5 Billion Brand

Dr. Squatch owned the Google search for natural soap for men and got about five sales a month from it, then found buyers for $3 to $4 each with a $15,000 Facebook video. Jack Haldrup's story shows PMs how to find demand nobody is searching for, and how a channel that works today can quietly stop working.

November 9, 2026 · 80 min listen · 16 min read · Jack Haldrup
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Context

Jack Haldrup started Dr. Squatch in 2012 as a side project while working as a consultant in Chicago. He launched with $1,500, shipped the first orders from a shelf in his closet, and grew it into a men's natural soap brand that hit $113 million in sales in 2020. Unilever acquired it in 2025 in a deal reportedly worth $1.5 billion. For PMs, the useful part is not the exit. It is how a product that had existed for centuries found a new market, why the search channel failed while the social feed worked, and what scaling did to the team, the cost base, and the founder's own role.

The Big Idea

Dr. Squatch did not win by inventing a better soap. It won by taking an existing product to people who would never go looking for it, and then finding the channel where those people would stumble onto it.

Jack Haldrup's breakthrough came when he realized his soap was an impulse purchase, not a searched-for purchase. That single insight moved his spend from Google to Facebook, tripled revenue the next month, and later turned a $15,000 video into a customer acquisition machine.

Key Insights

Bring products to new markets

Jack Haldrup's founding idea was market innovation, not product innovation.

  • The product: cold process soap, an old way of making soap that fell out of the mainstream in the early 1900s because it is hard to make at scale and costs more than store soap.
  • The gap: mainstream bar soap is made by a high-heat extrusion process, and Haldrup saw the category as commoditized, full of cheap products that weren't great.
  • The insight: his friends, 20-somethings in Chicago, were not shopping at farmers markets or buying artisan soap, but e-commerce could reach them.
  • The choice: he made a few batches himself but decided he did not need to build the best cold process soap ever made. His job was to introduce an existing product to a customer who would love it but didn't know it yet.

Small tweaks fit the audience

Haldrup did not rebuild the soap from scratch. He tailored existing soaps to what men would like, then let the brand do the differentiating.

  • A pine tar black soap became a huge seller.
  • A square bar shape set the product apart on sight.
  • A Chicago soap maker agreed to small changes in scent to appeal to men, and the launch had four to five SKUs.
  • His sister drew the Sasquatch character before there was a name, to fit a brand that was manly but funny, whimsical, and outdoorsy.
  • The team deliberately avoided Bigfoot references because they felt too over the top.

Search fails without existing demand

Haldrup's first paid channel was Google AdWords, and it hit a ceiling fast. Only a couple hundred people a month searched for terms like men's soap or natural soap. He once believed that owning the search term "natural soap for men" would mean the company had made it, and when it got there, the term brought in about five sales a month. The lesson for PMs: a search channel can only capture demand that already exists, and it tells you nothing about demand you could create.

Impulse products need feeds

A General Assembly digital marketing class showed Haldrup why Facebook fit better than Google. Very few people were actively looking to buy natural soap online. But if the soap showed up in their feed in a way that was interesting and entertaining, they would try it. Applying what he learned from the instructor gave the company an almost immediate 3x jump in revenue the month after the class. This only worked because the channel matched how customers actually decided to buy, on impulse, not by searching.

Channels decay as partners learn

Subscription boxes like Bespoke Post and Birchbox were Dr. Squatch's biggest somewhat scalable channel in 2013 and 2014, and the deal terms got worse over time.

  • Version one: the boxes paid at or slightly above cost, so the samples were essentially free marketing.
  • The payoff: if 4,000 bars went out in Bespoke Post boxes, about 10% of recipients might buy from Dr. Squatch afterward.
  • Then: brands gave product to the boxes for free.
  • Then: brands paid a fee to be included.
  • Finally: the boxes kept the follow-on sale, buying wholesale and selling on their own stores.

Haldrup said he understood why the boxes did this. But the channel went from profitable customer acquisition to brand marketing that no longer converted well.

Spend by unit economics, not budget

When Dr. Squatch's 2018 video ad took off, Haldrup did not set a marketing budget for it.

  • People watched two minutes of the ad for about half a cent on average.
  • A new customer cost $3 to $4.
  • An order was worth about $25, leaving roughly $10 per customer after margins.
  • At those numbers, he spent as much as he could, and supply chain was the real limit, not cash.

He called the video a sales machine. It ran hot on Facebook and YouTube for three to four months before slowing down.

Order size funds more acquisition

After raising money in 2019, Dr. Squatch expanded its product line. A bigger range raised the average order size, which made each customer more valuable and let the company spend more to acquire the next one. In 2016, the team had also started to learn subscription, merchandising, and email and retention marketing so that customers stayed valuable after the first order. Facebook ads got attention, but these back-end pieces made the spending pay off.

Overhead can quietly drain growth

In the six to nine months after the co-founder buyout, the business ran into trouble even though sales were growing.

  • The company added employees and an office, raising overhead until it drained profitability.
  • Haldrup stepped back from overseeing marketing, and marketing performance declined.
  • Some agency partners were not working out.
  • The buyout payments were stressing cash at the same time.

By 2018 the company was in a challenging spot. Haldrup called these normal small-business ups and downs, made worse by happening all at once.

Mental Models & Frameworks

Impulse buy versus searched buy

Ask whether customers go looking for your product or only buy it when it finds them. Dr. Squatch was an impulse purchase: almost nobody searched for natural soap, but an entertaining ad in a feed got people to try it. Search channels capture existing intent. Feed channels create it. Use this question before choosing an acquisition channel, since the wrong answer can cap growth no matter how well you execute.

Ad spend as a machine

Haldrup thinks about marketing incrementally rather than as a fixed budget.

  • Input: the cost to acquire one customer ($3 to $4 on the 2018 video).
  • Output: the margin that customer brings in (roughly $10 on a $25 order).
  • Rule: while each customer is profitable, keep spending as much as possible.
  • Limit: stop or slow when profitability drops or the supply chain cannot fulfill the orders.

Use it when a channel is clearly working, so a budget line doesn't hold back profitable growth.

Luck versus skill, 50/50

Haldrup splits his outcome roughly evenly between skill and luck.

  • Skill, part one: get started and create a vehicle, because without one you cannot benefit from lucky events.
  • Skill, part two: survive, which means knowing when the business is in survival mode and doing things most people won't want to do.
  • Skill, part three: execution, which decides how far you go.
  • Luck, timing: ten years earlier, Dr. Squatch could not have existed, because brick and mortar retail would not have taken it without proof of concept online.
  • Luck, category: he picked soap for personal reasons, not as a top-down market choice, and it happened to be a recurring product in a category ready to explode.
  • Luck, serendipity: many chance meetings and moments added up.

Decision Principles

Principle: Copy format, not price

  • When: a proven creative approach looks too expensive. The Harmon Brothers, who made Dollar Shave Club style videos, quoted Dr. Squatch $250,000 to produce a video plus $250,000 in managed ad spend, roughly a couple of years of profit.
  • Why: Haldrup and the San Diego agency Raindrop asked how hard it could be to recreate one of those videos themselves. They made it for about $15,000.

Principle: Cut line by line

  • When: costs have outgrown the business and profitability is gone.
  • Why: Haldrup printed three months of bank statements and circled or crossed out every line item he could. He let two people go and kept only the customer support and social media person. It felt like a step back, but it reset the company before its biggest growth year.

Principle: Raise when the model works

  • When: the business model is proven and capital would mainly add fuel.
  • Why: Haldrup bootstrapped until 2019, then raised $1.3 million from Guild Capital at a $5.7 million post-money valuation, mostly for marketing spend and hiring. He noted that the pitch of "we have it figured out, we just need fuel" is sometimes not true, but in Dr. Squatch's case it was. Sales went from about $5 million in 2018 to roughly $20 million to $23 million in 2019 and $113 million in 2020.

Trade-offs & Nuance

Viral is really efficient ads

Haldrup pushes back on calling the 2018 video viral. The team always knew it would be an ad. It spread mainly because it acquired customers so cheaply and profitably that the company kept spending on it, along with some real sharing. The video got 12 million views in its first year and drove an estimated 30% to 50% of the little over $5 million in 2018 sales. It now has 120 million views.

Tailwinds are hard to isolate

COVID scared the team at first, so they slowed down to avoid building too much inventory. A month or two in, demand was clearly surging, and being in hygiene added a tailwind. But Haldrup says the company was already growing fast before COVID, so it is hard to say how much of 2020's growth came from the pandemic.

Lifestyle versus scale ambitions

Haldrup's co-founder and childhood friend AJ Fountain wanted the business to fund a life spent outdoors, and at $1.8 million in sales it already did. Haldrup saw a much bigger vision. Host Guy Raz stressed that a lifestyle business is a perfectly good ambition. The problem was not either goal, but that the two partners no longer wanted the same thing.

  • They agreed to separate, and the process was very stressful personally and financially.
  • 2016 profit was roughly $100,000 on $1.8 million in sales, and cash was tied up in inventory and marketing.
  • So the buyout was structured as cash up front, monthly cash, and yearly payments based on business performance for a couple of years.
  • Haldrup took almost nothing out himself at that point, which he called delayed gratification.

Founder skills fit a stage

Haldrup knew he had a timeline as CEO. He felt well suited to an earlier-stage company but not equipped or motivated to run a large one. By 2023 Dr. Squatch had about 300 people, and the job felt like having a job again.

  • He describes a founder's will to succeed as what pushes through the "drudgery tax" of tasks you don't want to do.
  • After ten years, his willpower for those tasks was lower than the role needed.
  • That self-awareness was a big reason he sold a majority stake in 2021 and stepped down as CEO in 2023.
  • The fast shift into retail was another reason: retail went from essentially zero in 2021 to well over $300 million.

Common Mistakes

Mistake: Scaling overhead ahead of profit

After the 2016 buyout, Dr. Squatch added people and an office faster than the business could support. Haldrup said they couldn't afford what they had signed up for. The fix was a hard cut back to essentials, which then left room for a big bet on the video ad.

Mistake: Leaving the growth engine

Haldrup moved away from overseeing marketing during that same period, and performance declined. For a company whose growth depended almost entirely on paid ads, losing close attention to that function hurt quickly.

Mistake: Treating channel terms as permanent

The subscription box deals that once gave Dr. Squatch free sampling and 10% follow-on conversion slowly shifted toward fees and lost sales. Assuming a partner channel will keep its early terms leaves a team exposed when the partner optimizes for itself.

Practical Application

Check search volume before investing

Before putting budget into search ads or SEO, look up how many people actually search for your product's core terms each month. If the number is in the low hundreds, as it was for natural soap for men, test feed-based channels where the product can find the customer instead.

Write the unit economics down

For each acquisition channel, write the cost per new customer, the average first order value, and the margin left after costs. If a channel clears a profit on the first order, as Dr. Squatch's ads did at roughly break-even and later at about $10 per customer, decide what really limits spend (supply, team, cash) instead of defaulting to a fixed budget.

Track partner channel terms over time

For any distribution partner, such as a marketplace, app store feature, or bundle deal, log the terms and conversion rate each quarter. Watch for the pattern Dr. Squatch saw with subscription boxes: from paid, to free, to paying a fee, to the partner keeping the customer.

Prototype the expensive version cheaply

When a vendor quotes a big number for a proven format, try a scrappy version first. Dr. Squatch replaced a $500,000 production and media package with a $15,000 video made with a local agency, and that video drove an estimated 30% to 50% of 2018 sales.

Audit costs from raw statements

When profitability slips, print or export the last three months of spending and review every line item, as Haldrup did. Keep the roles that touch customers directly and cut overhead that doesn't drive growth yet.

Questions to Consider

  • Do our customers search for a product like ours, or would they only buy it if it showed up in front of them?
  • Is our product truly new, or are we bringing an existing product to a market that hasn't found it yet, the way Dr. Squatch did with cold process soap?
  • Which of our distribution partners has been quietly changing its terms, and what would we do if that channel stopped converting?
  • If one ad or campaign is acquiring customers profitably, what is actually stopping us from spending more on it today?
  • Has our team or office cost grown faster than profit, the way Dr. Squatch's overhead did after its 2016 co-founder buyout?

Bottom Line

Dr. Squatch grew by matching an old product to a new audience and a channel that fit how that audience actually buys. Once Jack Haldrup saw his soap as an impulse purchase and measured every ad by what each customer was worth, growth became a question of supply and cost discipline rather than marketing budget.

Resources Mentioned

ResourceTypeWhy it was mentioned
The 4-Hour WorkweekBookHaldrup named it as a classic he read while consulting, and Guy Raz linked it to Haldrup's comfort running the business remotely.
The Lean StartupBookHaldrup read it while learning about entrepreneurship on the road, and credited a lean startup mindset for focusing on the product rather than the size of the opportunity.
The Primal BlueprintBookOne of the first books Haldrup read after his psoriasis diagnosis, which pushed him toward natural foods and personal care products.
General Assembly digital marketing classCourseHaldrup spent $3,500 of his roughly $5,000 in savings on it, and it convinced him to move from Google ads to Facebook ads.

Case Studies Mentioned

The Sasquatch Soap rename

Dr. Squatch was first called Sasquatch Soap. Another company that sold 30 to 50 soaps had one called Sasquatch Soap and held common law rights to the name. Haldrup only found out because a third party tried to trademark his brand name. Facing what felt like an existential crisis, the team surveyed customers and friends on names like Kingsley's and Sudsworth's, and everyone thought they were terrible. They chose Dr. Squatch to make the brand more of a character, with "doctor" adding a slightly elevated feel, and kept a backup plan in case it was too close. It passed the trademark process. Lesson: the forced rename produced a better name and let the brand lean harder into its persona.

The $15,000 shower video

In 2018, Dr. Squatch and the San Diego agency Raindrop made a three-minute ad of a big bearded man in an outdoor shower telling viewers their soap was bad, then explaining why cold process soap was better. It cost about $15,000, compared with a $250,000 production quote from the Harmon Brothers. It acquired customers for $3 to $4 each and drove an estimated 30% to 50% of 2018 sales. Lesson: beyond the sales, Haldrup said it brought the brand to life, gave the team a roadmap for future content, and helped it find its voice.

Scaling cold process soap

Cold process soap fell out of the mainstream because it is hard to make at scale. Dr. Squatch eventually built its own manufacturing facility and figured out how to produce about five million a month, which Haldrup said took real engineering. Making one batch is easy. Making millions is a different problem. That capacity helped the brand move from online-only to shelves at stores like Target and Walmart, where most of its sales now come from.

People to Follow

Jack Haldrup

Founder and former CEO of Dr. Squatch, which he grew from a $1,500 side project to a brand Unilever reportedly bought for $1.5 billion. He stepped down as CEO in 2023, served on the board until the sale, and now invests in and advises other entrepreneurs from San Diego. He also serves on the board of Brick, a company that makes a device to help people spend less time on their phones.

Experiments to Try

Experiment: Search versus feed demand

  • Hypothesis: our product is an impulse purchase, so feed-based ads will acquire customers more cheaply than search ads, as Dr. Squatch found with natural soap.
  • Change: run a small, equal budget on search ads for our core terms and on entertaining feed ads aimed at the same audience.
  • Test: run both for a few weeks with the same landing page and offer.
  • Measure: cost per new customer, first order value, and how much search volume exists to scale into.

Experiment: Scrappy version of premium creative

  • Hypothesis: a low-cost version of a proven ad format can perform close to a professional one.
  • Change: produce one ad in a format that has worked for similar brands, on a small fraction of a typical agency quote, as Dr. Squatch did with its $15,000 video.
  • Test: run it against current best-performing ads.
  • Measure: watch time per cent spent, cost per customer, and margin per customer.

Notable Quotes

"I want to take this product to another market, not that I want to fundamentally change this product." (Jack Haldrup)

"I would think of that as like a sales machine." (Jack Haldrup)

"Brick and mortar retail would not have taken it in without a proof of concept online." (Jack Haldrup)

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