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FIGS: Trina Spear and Heather Hasson. The $2.5 Billion Scrubs Brand That Investors Said Would Never Work
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FIGS: Trina Spear and Heather Hasson. The $2.5 Billion Scrubs Brand That Investors Said Would Never Work

FIGS grew by treating scrubs not as a boring uniform category, but as a broken product and broken buying experience for a passionate, repeat-purchase user base. For PMs, it is a sharp lesson in how hidden pain, business model design, and community can matter more than a market's surface-level glamour.

October 26, 2026 · 72 min listen · 11 min read · Trina Spear, Heather Hasson
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Context

FIGS is a founder story, but the real product lesson is about seeing opportunity where everyone else sees a commodity. Heather Hasson noticed that healthcare workers had normalized bad scrubs, bad fit, and bad retail. Trina Spear then translated that intuition into a sharper market thesis: scrubs were mandated, self-funded by most workers, repeatedly purchased, and sold through a broken industry structure. For product managers, the episode matters because it shows how strong products often come from reframing an overlooked category, not from inventing something obviously new.

The Big Idea

A category can look too small, too boring, or too entrenched to matter, while still hiding a great product opportunity if users face daily pain, buy repeatedly, and feel ignored by incumbents.

FIGS did not create demand for scrubs. FIGS saw that healthcare workers were already spending in a market with weak product, bad distribution, and no real brand connection, then built around the end user instead of the old industry structure.

Key Insights

Normalized pain hid opportunity

  • Heather's first insight was not that healthcare workers were loudly demanding better scrubs. It was that they had accepted bad scrubs as normal.
  • That matters because users often understate opportunity in stale categories. They do not always say, "I hate this." They say, "This is just what we wear," and work around it.
  • The real signals were behavioral. Heather tailored scrubs for friends, got repeat requests, and saw that medical workers were driving to scrub stores in strip malls for a bad retail experience because they had no better option.
  • For PMs, this is a reminder that resignation can be as valuable a signal as outrage. A user who has stopped expecting better can still be a great customer for a better product.

Market quality beat market glamour

  • Trina's diligence showed why scrubs were better than they looked from the outside:
  • about 24 million healthcare professionals in the U.S.
  • about 140 million healthcare professionals globally
  • about a $10 billion U.S. market at the time
  • about an $80 billion global market now, as described in the episode
  • The category also had unusually attractive economics:
  • scrubs were often required for work
  • about 85% of healthcare professionals bought their own uniforms
  • the business was replenishment-driven
  • demand was non-seasonal
  • healthcare employment was recession-resistant
  • For PMs, this is a useful check against shallow TAM analysis. A market can be strategically attractive even if it lacks consumer hype.

Business model shaped product quality

  • FIGS was not just a design upgrade. It was also a business model upgrade.
  • The incumbents largely sold through distributors and paid licensing fees. Trina said those licensing fees could take 8% to 12% of the retail price, while retail distribution took much more.
  • Because FIGS sold direct, it could spend roughly double on product cost while charging only about 15% to 20% more than incumbent products.
  • That is a core product lesson: quality is often constrained by economics. If the margin stack is broken, even obvious product improvements can look impossible until distribution changes.

Users beat institutional buyers

  • The obvious enterprise path was hospital contracts. That path did not work.
  • Hospitals and clinic administrators were not the best customer to start with because they did not feel the daily pain in the same way individual healthcare workers did.
  • FIGS won by selling to the people who wore the product and, in most cases, paid for it themselves.
  • This is a strong PM reminder that "who approves," "who uses," and "who pays" are different questions. Early strategy improves when the team knows which of those people actually feels the problem most intensely.

Community lowered acquisition costs

  • FIGS did use digital marketing, and the timing helped because competitors were barely using it.
  • But the stronger growth loop came from community structure, not only ad efficiency:
  • healthcare workers work in dense institutions
  • scrub usage is highly visible
  • peers see the product every shift
  • word of mouth travels fast inside hospitals and clinics
  • The founders reinforced this with direct field learning. They sold scrubs outside emergency rooms at shift changes and used free coffee or hot cocoa to start conversations.
  • The outcome was real scale, not just early enthusiasm. The company said sales were around $1 million in 2015, $4 million in 2016, $55 million in 2018, $110 million in 2019, and $263 million in 2020.

Fast no preserved runway

  • The founders estimate they got roughly 300 to 400 investor no's.
  • Their response was not to keep lukewarm investors warm forever. They pushed for quick no's.
  • That matters because a vague maybe can be more expensive than a rejection. It burns time, attention, and emotional energy while adding no momentum.
  • For PMs, the broader lesson is useful beyond fundraising. In roadmap debates, partnerships, and stakeholder reviews, unresolved ambiguity often costs more than a clear decision.

Mental Models & Frameworks

Mandated replenishment market test

Use this lens when a market looks boring but may be stronger than it appears:

  • Required use: does the user need the product to do the job?
  • Self-funded purchase: does the end user choose and buy it personally?
  • Repeat demand: is the product bought again and again?
  • Year-round usage: is demand steady instead of seasonal?
  • Economic resilience: does the category survive downturns better than average?

FIGS passed all five. That is why scrubs were more attractive than many trendier categories.

Solve for normalized frustration

  • Some categories hide opportunity because users have stopped imagining improvement.
  • In those cases, direct feature requests can mislead. Discovery has to focus on workarounds, tailoring, bad retail rituals, or apologetic language like "that's just how it is."
  • Heather's insight came from observing resignation and workaround behavior, not from reading a survey full of intense complaints.
  • PMs can use this model when a category looks stagnant and user feedback seems oddly passive.

Dense community growth loop

A product can compound through community when three conditions are true:

  • users work near each other
  • product use is visible
  • recommendations spread peer to peer

Healthcare professionals met all three conditions. Better scrubs were effectively worn in public every day. That made each satisfied customer a credible acquisition channel.

Create the market ceiling

  • Many investors said scrubs were not a big enough category.
  • The founders' answer was that a better product can expand category value by increasing willingness to pay, repeat purchase, and emotional connection to the product.
  • This does not mean TAM math is useless. It means current-category TAM can undercount what a redesigned product and business model can unlock.
  • PMs should use this model carefully. It is most credible when there is already recurring spend, visible dissatisfaction, and a clear reason incumbents under-serve the market.

Decision Principles

Principle: Find the real chooser

  • When: a market includes institutions, distributors, and end users with different incentives.
  • Why: FIGS grew when it focused on healthcare professionals who actually wore and often bought the product, not on administrators who felt less pain and had weaker urgency.

Principle: Push for quick no's

  • When: investors, partners, or internal stakeholders stay vague in a category they do not intuitively understand.
  • Why: a fast rejection protects time and cash. FIGS treated indecision as a likely no and kept moving.

Principle: Stay narrow longer

  • When: a team with brand momentum feels pressure to expand into adjacent categories too early.
  • Why: FIGS believes the core healthcare market still has a long runway, with only a fraction of the world's 140 million healthcare professionals reached so far.

Trade-offs & Nuance

Focus delayed obvious adjacency

  • FIGS could plausibly move into adjacent comfort apparel, and the host raised that possibility directly.
  • The founders' view was that the core healthcare market still offered enough headroom to justify staying focused on scrubs and healthcare apparel.
  • The trade-off is speed versus clarity. Focus keeps brand, operations, and roadmap aligned. Expansion can open new revenue, but it also raises execution complexity before the core is fully won.

Litigation protected and distracted

  • Fighting the competitor lawsuit cost about $40 million in legal spend.
  • The founders still believed it was rational because the lawsuit sought about $800 million and challenged the legitimacy of the business itself.
  • The hidden cost was not just legal fees. It was discovery, depositions, board time, and leadership attention.
  • The lesson is not "always fight." The lesson is that legal defense can become a strategic product decision when the case threatens brand trust or freedom to operate.

One investor simplified fundraising

  • Thomas Tull eventually bought out the other investors, which removed fundraising overhead and gave FIGS a committed backer.
  • That simplification came with a classic concentration risk. One major investor can create dependence if incentives drift.
  • FIGS mitigated that by structuring founder control of the board vote.

Mission required profitable core

  • The founders care deeply about healthcare workers, philanthropy, and advocacy.
  • Their point was practical: those efforts depend on a business that actually makes money.
  • For PMs, this is a healthy correction to vague mission language. Purpose scales better when the product and business model already work.

Common Mistakes

Mistake: Let gatekeepers define demand

  • FIGS could have decided the market was weak because hospitals and clinics did not respond to early outreach.
  • That would have been the wrong conclusion. The strongest signal sat with individual healthcare professionals, not administrators.
  • The better move is to separate gatekeeper response from end-user demand before declaring a market unattractive.

Mistake: Trust static TAM math

  • Many investors saw scrubs as a small or unimportant category and stopped there.
  • That missed the deeper structure: mandatory use, repeat purchase, direct willingness to pay, and dense word of mouth.
  • PMs make the same mistake when they size only today's category spend and ignore how much value a better product could create.

Practical Application

Audit a stale category

  • Pick one part of your market that people treat as boring, fixed, or unchangeable.
  • Interview users, but do not stop at what they say they want. Look for workarounds, aftermarket fixes, resignation, or rituals they tolerate because they assume there is no alternative.
  • Those signals often reveal stronger product opportunity than a straightforward feature wishlist.

Map purchase economics fully

On the next market-sizing exercise, write down:

  • who uses the product
  • who chooses the product
  • who pays for the product
  • how often the product is replaced
  • whether demand is seasonal or constant
  • how many intermediaries take margin

This map often reveals product opportunity that headline TAM numbers miss.

Test acquisition at pain points

  • FIGS learned directly from healthcare workers at shift changes outside emergency rooms.
  • The PM equivalent is to run discovery and message tests where the user's problem is most active, not only in scheduled interviews or survey panels.
  • When the pain is real, feedback is usually clearer at the moment of friction.

Build for visible advocacy

  • If your product spreads inside a tight professional network, design for peer visibility.
  • That could mean making quality easy to notice, making adoption easy to copy, or creating moments users naturally talk about with coworkers.
  • FIGS benefited because the product was physically visible at work. Software teams should ask what the equivalent visible proof is in their own category.

Separate value from valuation

  • Track operating truth separately from market mood.
  • The FIGS founders lived through public-market swings from roughly $8 billion to roughly $400 million and then back to roughly $2 billion in company value.
  • PMs should anchor on user value, repeat behavior, and business health before reacting emotionally to external narratives.

Questions to Consider

  • Where in your product area have users accepted a poor workflow as normal, the way healthcare workers accepted bad scrubs and bad scrub stores for years?
  • Are you evaluating your market only by current category spend, or have you checked whether better design, brand, or distribution could increase willingness to pay and repurchase?
  • In your market, who actually chooses the product day to day, and is that person different from the institutional buyer or procurement contact?
  • Which current stakeholder conversations would move faster if you pushed for a clear yes or no instead of letting a vague maybe linger?
  • If your team is considering adjacency bets, what evidence shows the core market is truly saturated rather than simply harder to keep executing against?

Bottom Line

FIGS won by seeing product opportunity where others saw a commodity: hidden user pain, broken economics, and a community ready to spread something better. For PMs, the episode is a reminder that great opportunities often live inside categories everyone else has learned to ignore, as long as you understand the user, the buying structure, and the growth loop better than the incumbents do.

Notable Quotes

"I'm going to make the best damn scrubs out there." (Heather Hasson)

"The only thing that ended up truly working was going direct to this community and building a relationship with them one-to-one at scale." (Trina Spear)

"We were very focused on getting fast no's, fast no's." (Trina Spear)

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